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LEGALITY OF TAx CREDITS TO
FEDERALLY ESTABLISHED EXCHANGES IN LIGHT OF
KING V. B UR WELL
AND THE NEED TO CLARIFY CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Adair Martin Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama sipned the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law. The ACA is a
major health care overhaul, reforming the health care system in the
United States to "increase the number of Americans covered by health
insurance and decrease the cost of healthcare."2 Since its passage, the
ACA has generated multiple lawsuits concerning its constitutionality,
but the Supreme Court upheld the landmark Act on June 25, 2015.'
The ACA, in part, achieves its goal of establishing universal health
care through the establishment of "American Health Benefit Exchanges"
(Exchanges) under § 1311 of the Act.4 Exchanges essentially are
marketplaces that allow individuals to compare and purchase insurance
plans online.5 The ACA allows each state an opportunity to establish its
own Exchange, but provides that the Federal Government will establish
Exchanges if the state does not in an effort to ensure that all Americans
have access to affordable health care.
6
Also crucial to the success and implementation of the ACA is the
availability of tax credits for individuals who need financial assistance
or who purchase health insurance through the Exchanges.7 These tax
credits are essential because without the subsidies in place, it would not
be economically feasible for many Americans to purchase health
insurance.8 This is contrary to the goals of the ACA and the individual
mandate, which requires most Americans to obtain "minimum essential"
*Associate Member, 2014-2015, University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like to thank
Marshall Smith and Alice H. Martin for their invaluable commentary in helping to formulate this note
and for their endless love and support.
1. Key Features of the Affordable Care Act By Year, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/timeline-text.html, (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
2. Nat'l Fed'n of ndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012).
3. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
4. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18031 (2010).
5. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2482.
6. Id.
7. Christine Eibner & Evan Saltzman, Assessing Alternative Modifications to the Affordable
Care Act: Impact on Individual Market Premiums and Insurance Coverage, RAND CoRP. 1 (2014),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchreports/RR700/RR708/RANDRR708.pdf.
8. Id. at 2.
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insurance coverage by 2014 or else pay a penalty. 9 The tax credits
incentivize all states to establish an Exchange in order to receive a
subsidy to lower the amount taxpayers spend on their monthly
premium.' °  If a state does not create an Exchange, the Federal
Government will provide one through federal Exchanges, running on
HealthCare.gov. 11 Despite the creation of a tax credit, only sixteen
states and the District of Columbia have established Exchanges,
meaning that the remaining thirty-four states rely on federally facilitated
Exchanges. 12
The provision of tax credits to federal Exchanges has resulted in
lawsuits filed by a coalition of states, employers, and individuals
arguing that, based on the language of the ACA, tax credits can be
offered only in state-run Exchanges.' 3  On July 22, 2014, the D.C.
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit rendered decisions on this issue but
reached opposite conclusions, calling into question whether the federal
government is properly following the regulations set out in the ACA.14
On November 7, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
King v. Burwell and upheld the tax credit subsidies for both state and
federal Exchanges. 15
This Casenote examines the split circuit decisions in Halbig v.
Burwell and King v. Burwell, ultimately decided by the Supreme Court
on June 25, 2015. Part II of the Casenote explains the relevant portions
9. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). See also 26
U.S.C.S. § 5000A (2010):
(a) Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage. An applicable individual shall for each
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.
(b) Shared responsibility payment.
(1) In general. If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an applicable individual for whom the
taxpayer is liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for I or more
months, then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty
with respect to such failures...
10. See id.
11. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18041(c).
12. See The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of the Potential
Marketplace Population, http://kff.orgfhealth-reform/state-indicator/marketplace-enrollment-as-a-share-
of-the-potential-marketplace-population/, (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). As of April 2014, the following
states have established a state-based marketplace Exchange: California, Colorado, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The states of Arkansas, Delaware
Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, and West Virginia have adopted partnership marketplace, which is
essentially a hybrid model in which a state operates certain functions.
13. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014); King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th
Cir. 2014).
14. See Halbig, 758 F.3d 390 (holding that subsidies are only available only in state-run
exchanges). But see King, 759 F.3d 358 (approving the subsidies for state-run exchanges).
15. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015).
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of the ACA at issue in Halbig and King. Part III reviews each court's
statutory interpretation of the ACA regulations and the ultimate
decisions in both cases. Part IV concludes that, despite using an
incorrect method of statutory interpretation, the Fourth Circuit correctly
decided this issue because applying a plain language reading of the tax
credit statute creates an absurdity and is against the clear intentions of
Congress. Finally, Part V analyzes the Supreme Court's decision to
apply tax credits to all Exchanges, reiterating its decision to uphold the
ACA in NFIB v. Sebelius.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patient Protection and the Affordable Care Act
The ACA requires that "[a]n Exchange... be a governmental agency
or nonprofit entity that is established by a State"' 6 and that "[a]n
Exchange . . . make[s] available qualified health plans to qualified
individuals and qualified employers."' 17 Therefore, the ACA delegates
the prima 7  responsibility to the states to establish their own
Exchanges. Because Congress cannot require states to implement
federal laws,19 if a state elects not to establish an Exchange, the federal
government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS), "shall ... establish and operate such Exchange within the state
and the Secretary shall take such actions as are necessary to implement
such other requirements. 2 ° Furthermore, under each qualified health
plan, there shall be a refundable tax credit available to subsidize costs
for the individual consumer who purchased health insurance through an
Exchange.2'
B. 26 CFR 1.36B-2 (IRS Rule)22
Despite the ACA's charge that the Exchanges must be established by
a state, the Internal Revenue Service passed a regulation (IRS Rule),
16. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18031(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 18031(2)(A) (2010).
18. See id.
19. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394.
20. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18041(c)(1)(B)(1I) (2010).
21. 26 U.S.C.S. § 36B(a) (2010).
22. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (2012), Eligibility for premium tax credit:
(a) In general. An applicable taxpayer... is allowed a premium assistance amount only for any month
that one or more members of the applicable taxpayer's family ....
(1) Is enrolled in one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange; and
(2) Is not eligible for minimum essential coverage....
2016]
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which interprets Section 36B broadly and authorizes subsidies for
insurance purchased on federally established Exchanges.23 In passing
this rule, the IRS asserted that the statutory language of Section 36B, the
ACA in its totality, and the legislative history supported its position.24
Yet, "[c]ommentators [disagree] on whether the language in Section
36B(b)(2)(A) limits the availability of the premium tax credit only to
taxpayers who enroll in qualified health plans on State Exchanges. 25
Two major differences exist between the petitioner's interpretation
and the IRS Rule. First, the IRS Rule increases the number of
individuals who will be required to purchase health insurance due to the
provisions in the individual mandate. 26 Under this mandate, individuals
do not suffer a penalty for failing to maintain "minimum essential
coverage" if the annual cost of the cheapest available coverage, less any
tax credits, exceeds eight percent of their income.27 By some estimates,
these credits "will determine on which side of the eight percent
threshold millions of individuals fall," which could significantly
increase the number of taxpayers who must choose between purchasing
health insurance or paying a penalty.28
Second, the IRS Rule induces large business owners to provide full-
time employees with health insurance. 29 Under the IRS's interpretation
of the ACA, large employers who fail to offer full-time employees
suitable coverage if one or more of those employees enroll in a qualified
health plan, are penalized under the ACA. 30  Thus, the tax credits
penalize large employers-those with fifty or more employees-and
forces them to provide their full-time employees with health insurance. 31
III. D.C. CIRCUIT VERSUS FOURTH CIRCUIT SUBSIDY INTERPRETATION
A. Halbig v. Burwell
In Halbig v. Burwell, the appellants were individuals and employers
who lived in states that chose not to establish Exchanges and sued on
23. See id. § 1.36B-2(a)(l)("ln general. An applicable taxpayer ... is allowed a premium
assistance amount only for any month that one or more members of the applicable taxpayer's family...
[i]s enrolled in one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange." [hereinafter IRS Rule].
24. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
25. Id. (quoting Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30.377, 30.378 (May 23,
2012)).
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C.S. § 5000A(e)(l)(A)-(B) (2010) (emphasis added)).
28. Id.
29. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 395.
30. Id.
31. Id.
[VOL. 84
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grounds that the federal government's interpretation of Section 36B was
not in accordance with law.32 The primary argument proffered by the
appellants was that the statutory language of the ACA stating "through
an Exchange established by the State" 33 clearly demonstrates that only
state-based Exchanges may receive subsidies.34 The appellants asserted
that the federal government was not a "State" under 42 U.S.C. §
18024(d),35 and therefore, all federally-created Exchanges were not
eligible to receive tax credits under the ACA.36 In contrast, the
government argued that appellants' reading of Section 36B would
render the ACA absurd and frustrate the purpose of the health care
overhaul.37 Because of this, the subsidies must also apply to federal
Exchanges.
38
The D.C. Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the appellants, finding
that "a Federal Exchange is not an 'Exchange established by the State,'
and Section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for
insurance purchased on Federal Exchanges." 39  The D.C. Circuit
reached this decision by: (1) reviewing Section 36B in relation to ACA
§§ 1311 and 1321, (2) finding the government's absurdity argument
baseless, and (3) examining the ACA's purpose and legislative history.4 °
First, the D.C. Circuit examined §§ 1311 and 1321 of the ACA and
determined that the statutory language intentionally excluded subsidies
from applying to the federal government.41 Section 1311 of the ACA
provides that states "shall" establish Exchanges. Despite this language,
both parties agreed that this was merely a suggestion and not a
requirement.42 However, if a state chose not to establish an Exchange, §
1321 required the federal overnment to "establish and operate such
Exchange within the State."3 The D.C. Circuit found that the use of the
word "such" in § 1321 conveyed that federal Exchanges were "the
equivalent of the Exchange a state would have established had it elected
to do So."'44 Therefore, if a state chose not to establish an Exchange, the
federal government would establish one within the state. Yet, nothing in
32. See generally id.
33. 26 U.S.C.S. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
34. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d at 399.
35. Id. at 398 (defining "State" as "each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.").
36. Id. at 399.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 399.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.S. §18041(c)(1) (2010) (emphasis added)).
44. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 399.
2016]
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the ACA deemed federally established Exchanges to be considered
"Exchange[s] established by the State. 45 The D.C. Circuit found that
this omission demonstrated that Congress intended only for state-created
Exchanges to receive tax credits. Furthermore, the court noted that
widely accepted canons of statutory construction indicate that Congress
acted intentionally when it used certain language in one part of the
statute and omitted the same language in another part of the statute.46
The D.C. Circuit next analyzed whether prohibiting federally
established Exchanges from receiving tax credits would render the ACA
absurd and found that it would not because the Act still enforced the
individual mandate.47 Under the absurdity doctrine, courts do "not give
effect to a statute's literal meaning when doing so would 'render [the]
statute nonsensical or superfluous... or [create] an outcome so contrar
to perceived social values that Congress could not have intended it."' 8
To avoid giving the absurdity doctrine an overbroad application, the
D.C. Circuit imposed a "high threshold" of unreasonableness before it
"concluded that a statute does not mean what it says."49  This high
threshold provides that a provision "may seem odd" without reaching
the level of absurdity and, in these instances, it is Congress's duty, not
the court's, to clarify the law.5° In framing the absurdity argument, the
government alleged that failure to provide tax credits would render
Section 36B superfluous. 51 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument,
finding that reporting by federal Exchanges still served the purpose of
enforcing the individual mandate, even if tax credits were not
available.52
Finally, the D.C. Circuit looked at the legislative history and purpose
of the ACA to determine congressional intent.53 Courts must assume
"that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used., 54 It is only when "apparently plain language compels an
odd result [that the Court] might look to legislative history to ensure that
45. Id. at 400.
46. Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 296 (1983)).
47. Id. at 402.
48. Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
49. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 402 (citing Cook, 594 F.3d at 891).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 403.
53. Id. The court noted that precedent is split. One line of cases instructs the court to stop its
review and give effect to the statute's unambiguous language, while another line of cases instructs the
court to consider legislative history. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102,
137 (D.C. Cir. 2012) and Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
54. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 407 (quoting Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 137 (1984) (noting that the most traditional tool to determine congressional intent is to read the
text).
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the literal application of a statute will [not] produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters." 55 There must be
evidence in the legislative history that Congress meant something other
than the plain meaning of the statute to depart from a plain reading.56
The D.C. Circuit found that the ACA's legislative history provided little
insight into congressional intent regarding the availability of tax credits
for Exchanges created by the federal government.57 The government
assumed that all states would cooperate and create their own Exchanges
and, accordingly, subsidies would be available on all Exchanges.58
Additionally, the government and its amici did not provide any specific
floor statements by Senate sponsors on this particular issue, so the court
was left to infer meaning from silence. 59 Determining there was no
evidence regarding congressional intent, the D.C. Circuit refused to
depart from the plain meaning of the ACA.6 °
B. King v. Burwell
In King v. Burwell, the plaintiffs, four individuals from Virginia, sued
several departments in the federal government including the Department
of Health and Human Services and the Internal Revenue Service
because they did not want to purchase comprehensive health
insurance. 61 Virginia failed to establish a state-run Exchange and was
served by a federal Exchange, known as HealthCare.gov. 62  The
plaintiffs would have been exempt from the individual mandate under
the unaffordability doctrine 63 if the tax credits did not apply to federal
Exchanges; however, because subsidies were available to all individuals
55. Id. (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, ex. Rel. Certain of its Members v. United States EPA, 88
F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)
(internal citations omitted)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 407-08 (referencing Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating
Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES at A17 (Aug. 5, 2012) ("When Congress passed legislation to expand
coverage two years ago, Mr. Obama and lawmakers assumed that every state would set up its own
exchange .... )).
59. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 408. While there were some specific floor statements on this issue, as
the Fourth Circuit notes in King v. Burwell, the D.C. Circuit considered only information given by the
amici and the Court itself did not search for applicable floor statements.
60. Id.
61. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014).
62. Id.
63. The unaffordability doctrine exempts individuals from buying health care under the
individual mandate if health care premiums are more than 8% of household income or if household
income is below the filing threshold. See Unaffordable Coverage Under the Affordable Care Act,
THOMAS REUTERS, http://cs.thomsonreuters.com/ua/ut/2014_csus_en/ius/faq/unaffordable-coverage-
under-affordable-care-act.htm?refrype=pod (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
2016]
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participating in any Exchange under the IRS Rule, the plaintiffs were
subject to the minimum coverage penalty.64 The plaintiffs asserted that,
as a result of the IRS Rule, they would incur financial loss by being
forced to either purchase insurance or pay the individual mandate
penalty.65
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that taxpayers should not receive a
tax credit for purchasing insurance through a federal Exchange because
the statutory language only mentions the credit being available under
state-run Exchanges in § 1311 of the ACA.66 The plaintiffs first argued
that if Congress had intended to include federally-run Exchanges, it
would not have specifically used the word "State." The plaintiffs also
contended that the federal government was not a "State," so the phrase
"Exchange established by the State" alone supported the idea that credits
were unavailable to consumers on federal Exchanges. 67 Therefore, the
plaintiffs argued that the omission in Section 36B of any reference to the
federal Exchanges showed Congress's intent to provide tax subsidies
only to state Exchanges.68
Section 1312 of the ACA provides that only "qualified individuals"-
defined as an individual who "resides in the State that established the
Exchange"-may purchase health plans through marketplace
Exchanges. 69 The defendants argued that if tax credits can be given
only in state Exchanges, there would be no qualified individuals present
in states with federally facilitated Exchanges. Accordingly, federal
Exchanges would have no eligible customers, a clear frustration of
Congress's intent in passing the ACA.70
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants and
held that the tax credit subsidies applied to federal Exchanges. 71 The
court found that, while a literal reading of the statute comported more
closely with the plaintiffs position, the IRS Rule better complimented
the broad policy goals of the ACA.72 Therefore, the IRS Rule must be
given deference under the framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.73
In making its decision, the Fourth Circuit first reviewed the statute
64. King, 759 F.3d at 365.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 368.
67. Id.
68. id.
69. King, 759 F.3d at 370.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 369.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 376.
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itself and applied the two-step Chevron test of statutory interpretation. 74
The first step looks to the plain meaning of the statue to determine if the
regulation responds to the plain meaning and, if it does, the regulation
stands.75  However, if "the statute is susceptible to multiple
interpretations, the court then moves to Chevron's second step and
defers to the agency's interpretation so long as it is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."76
Using the Chevron analysis, the court first considered the language of
the statute.77  The Fourth Circuit specifically noted that when
conducting a statutory analysis, a court should not confine itself to only
examining a particular part of the statute in isolation, but should look at
the provision when placed in context to determine its meaning. 78 Under
this statutory framework, the Fourth Circuit found neither side's
argument so persuasive as to make the intent of Congress clear.79
Because the plain language did not provide a solution to the issue, the
court next reviewed the legislative history to determine the statute's
plain meaning. The Fourth Circuit determined that the ACA's
legislative history failed to provide insight on the issue of tax credits
despite the length of the bill.80 However, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
there were several floor statements from senators that only made sense if
all Americans are understood to have access to the tax credits.
81
The Fourth Circuit also noted that the plaintiffs had a compelling
argument because it is possible that these statements were made under
the assumption that each state would establish its own Exchange and
therefore legislators could not foresee the issue being litigated.82 Both
the plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments were persuasive, so the Fourth
Circuit ultimately ruled that nothing in the legislative history of the
ACA provided compelling support to adopt either side's position.
Therefore, this case could not be resolved by simply looking at the first
step of the Chevron analysis.
83
Because plain language and legislative history provided no results,
the court moved to the second step of the Chevron two-step test, which
asks whether the "agency's [action was] based on a permissible
74. King, 759 F.3d at 367.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 368 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001)).
78. Id. (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666
(2007)).
79. King, 759 F.3d at 371.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 372.
82. Id.
83. Id.
2016]
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construction of the statute." 84 The Fourth Circuit found that the statute
permitted the IRS to decide whether tax credits were available on
federal Exchanges because the IRS Rule promoted the ACA's broad
policy goals to increase the number of Americans with health insurance
and decrease coverage costs. 85  Several provisions of the ACA were
necessary to advance these goals, including the individual mandate
requiring near-universal participation in the insurance marketplace.86
Congress created various incentives-including the tax credits-to
increase market participation among low- and middle-income
individuals, so denying these tax subsidies to individuals on federal
Exchanges would frustrate Congress's policy goals in enacting the
ACA.87 Not allowing tax credits to be distributed on federal Exchanges
"would cause premiums to rise, further discouraging market
participation, and the ultimate result would be an adverse-selection
'death spiral' in the individual insurance markets in States with
federally-run Exchanges. 88  These findings demonstrated that tax
credits are essential to the ACA and, without the credits in place,
millions of Americans would be unable to purchase insurance and would
be forced to pay a penalty that Congress did not foresee.89 The IRS
Rule avoided this result by ensuring that the tax credits are offered on
federal Exchanges. Accordingly, the Court deferred to the IRS under
Chevron because the IRS interpretation of the ACA was a "reasonable
policy choice for the agency to make." 90
IV. ANALYSIS
Subpart A of this Section discusses three standards of statutory
construction: the plain language test, the Chevron test, and the Skidmore
test. Subpart B concludes that the D.C. Circuit placed too much
emphasis on the plain language of the statute when it should have
considered congressional intent. Subpart B also determines that the
Fourth Circuit incorrectly used the Chevron test and instead should have
84. King, 759 F.3d at 372 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
85. Id. at 373. See also Viii. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding that "when an agency interprets ambiguities in its organic statute, it is entirely
appropriate for that agency to consider.., policy arguments that are rationally related to the [statute's]
goals."); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding "as long as the
agency stays within [Congress's] delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting the statute,
and such interpretations are entitled to deference.").
86. King, 759 F.3d at 374.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 375.
90. Id.
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analyzed this case under the Skidmore test because it historically has
been the standard applied to tax issues. Subpart C then analyzes the
Supreme Court opinion in King v. Burwell and concludes that while the
Court reached the correct result, it erroneously applied the major
questions doctrine instead of the Chevron test, which will create
uncertainty for agencies and the government in future decision-making.
A. Applicable Statutory Interpretation Methods
The underlying issue in this case is whether the relevant code
sections, §§ 36B, 1311, and 1321, are ambiguous. When analyzing a
statute, it is widely accepted that "a reviewing court should not confine
itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation, as the
meaning, or ambiguity of certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context." 9' When a court finds the "terms of a
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and
exceptional circumstances. ' 92  A situation is considered "rare and
exceptional" if following the letter of the law would result in an
"absurdity... so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense."
Additionally, "there must be something to make plain the intent of
Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail. 93 Therefore,
unless a plain language reading would result in an absurdity or produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, courts
must apply the plain language of a statute when the language is
unambiguous because it is presumed that a "legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there."
94
However, if a statute is ambiguous, courts are required to apply a
different test that analyzes and interprets the statute instead of
considering the mere plain language of the law. There are several
applicable statutory interpretation tests for federal review of an agency's
interpretation of the law. The first agency deference test the Supreme
Court adopted was developed in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 95 In Skidmore,
the Court held that the deference given to an agency reading of a statute
depends on "(1) the thoroughness evident in [the agency's]
91. Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Construction and Application of "Chevron Deference" to
Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 25, 8 (2005) (citing Food &
Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
92. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55,
60 (1930)). See also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 335, 241-42 (1989) (holding that "as
long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there is generally no need for a court to inquire
beyond the plain language of the statute.").
93. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
94. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
95. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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consideration, (2) the validity of its reasoning, (3) its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and (4) all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 96 Thus, Skidmore gives
deference to the agency in proportion to the agency's power to persuade.
Forty years later, the Supreme Court adopted the two-step standard in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., discussed in
Section III of this Note, which gave agency interpretation even greater
deference and effectively replaced Skidmore.97 However, in 2001 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Skidmore as the default deference regime
with its ruling in United States v. Mead Corp., holding that Chevron is
limited to instances when there is a congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority to the agency. 98 The Court ruled that the measure
of deference to be given to an agency's interpretation of a statute varies
with the circumstances, and courts must look "to the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency's position."99 Mead, therefore, merely is
an extension of the Court's prior ruling in Skidmore, reaffirming the
controlling law.
As demonstrated, there are several tests that courts could consider
using in its analysis of statutory interpretation. To further complicate
matters, research show that the majority of time, the Supreme Court
does not apply a deference regime in its decision-making and when it
does, its application of the standard is inconsistent.l°° This confusion
results in uncertainty as to how lower courts should assess agency
interpretations of statutes and makes Supreme Court decision-making
even harder to predict. A study conducted by professors from Yale Law
School examined all 1,014 of the agency interpretation cases decided by
the Supreme Court from 1984 to 2006 and found that the Court applied
no deference regime in its decision-making 53.6% of the time, with the
agency interpretation prevailing in 68.3% of cases. 10' In 17.8% of
cases, the Court invoked consultative deference, in which it did not
invoke a named deference regime, but relied on input from the agency in
its decision-making. 10 2 Finally, Skidmore deference was applied 6.7%
of the time with an agency win rate of 73.5%, and Chevron deference
96. Id. at 140.
97. See generally William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083 (Apr.
2008).
98. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001).
99. Id. at 228.
100. See Eskridge, supra note 97, at 1090-91.
101. Id. at 1099.
102. Id.
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was applied 8.3% of the time with an agency win rate of 76.2%.103
The Yale study interestingly found that the Court was more likely to
give deference to the agency interpretation in certain areas of law:
primarily national security, tax, or instrumental economic regulation. 1
04
For tax, the study found that the Court generally applied the Skidmore
test and that the agency win rate was 75.7%.10' Not surprisingly, the
study also found that the Justices agreed more with statutory
interpretations that were in line with their political ideology 0 6 and that
Justices overall were more likely to side with the agency
interpretation. 10 7 The study concluded its findings by suggesting that
the Court should simplify its deference standard by applying Chevron
deference in cases which "Congress has delegated lawmaking authority
to an executive or independent agency[,]' 10 8 and by applying Skidmore
in cases where "(a) the agency has expertise on issues as to which
judges do not; (b) the agency has rendered a reasoned judgment after
input from the public; and/or (c) there has been public or private reliance
on agency rules or guidelines." 10 9 The study found that these are the
guidelines that the Court uses in voting, so the aforementioned method
should be adopted to simplify the deference continuum. 110
B. The Fourth Circuit Incorrectly Applied the Chevron Test in
Concluding that Tax Credits Must be Allowed in All Exchanges When it
Should Have Invoked the Skidmore Deference Test
Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit was correct in its decision
to not apply the plain language test. The statute has obvious ambiguities
that render the plain language test inapplicable. For example, Section
36B explicitly states that Exchanges are to be established by the
States" and § 1311 states "[e]ach state shall ... establish an American
Health Exchange" to "facilitate[] the purchase of qualified health
plans." ' 1 2  Despite this language suggesting Exchanges must be
103. Id. at 1099. The remaining 13.6% not accounted for is made up of minority deference
regimes rarely used.
104. Id. at 1179.
105. Id. at 1145.
106. Id. at 1155.
107. Id. at 1153 (finding no Justice displayed an overall agency agreement rate less than 52.6%).
108. Id. at 1092.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 26 U.S.C.S. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010). "[A]s of the first day of such month the taxpayer, the
taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent of the taxpayer is covered by a qualified health plan ... that was
enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act... "(emphasis added).
112. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18031(b)(1) (2010).
2016]
13
Smith: Legality of Tax Credits to Federally Established Exchanges in Lig
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
established by the state, § 1312 adds ambiguity in allowing the
Department of Health and Human Services to operate "such [an]
Exchange within the State[s]" that do not establish an Exchange
independently. 113 The term "such Exchange" provides ambiguity as to
whether it is referring to state- or federal-based Exchanges. Therefore,
the Court cannot apply a plain language reading of this statute but must
look to either the Chevron or Skidmore test to determine how much
deference to give the IRS Rule.
Though the Fourth Circuit correctly determined that tax credits must
be allowed in all health care Exchanges, it incorrectly applied the
Chevron test instead of the Skidmore standard. The Fourth Circuit
should have used Skidmore in its analysis because the Supreme Court
most frequently uses this standard when dealinf with tax-related issues
and it is now the default test pursuant to Mead. Under Skidmore, the
IRS Rule would still have been given deference because it has all the
"factors which give it power to persuade." 115 The IRS interpretation is
more persuasive than the D.C. Circuit's decision in Halbig v. Burwell,
because the legislative history and broad policy goals of the ACA
support a finding that tax credits apply to all Exchanges, not just state-
created ones. Also, the IRS Rule is persuasive in showing that a failure
to apply tax credits to federal Exchanges would render parts of the ACA
absurd.
1. Legislative History and the ACA Text Demonstrate a Congressional
Intent that Tax Subsidies Should be Made Available to All Americans
a. Legislative History
Although there is not much documented in the legislative history as to
whether Congress specifically addressed the issue of whether tax credits
apply to all Exchanges or only state-created Exchanges, there is
evidence of Congress's intent available in a 2009 CBO Report, floor
statements from various senators, and the highly politicized nature of the
law, thus making it unlikely that Congress would have trusted the states
113. Id. § 18041(c)(B)(ii)(11) (2010):
"In general. If-
(B) the Secretary determines, on or before January 1, 2013, that an electing State-
(i) Will not have any required Exchange operational by January 1, 2014; or
(ii) has not taken the actions the Secretary determines necessary to implement-
(11) . . . the Secretary shall (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and
operate such Exchange within the State and the Secretary shall take such actions as are necessary to
implement such other requirements."
114. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001).
115. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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to implement the legislation without oversight from the federal
government.
A report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued in
November of 2009-several months before the ACA was passed into
law-further demonstrates Congress's intent that the subsidies be used
nationwide." 6  This report estimated that approximately "23 million
people would purchase insurance through the exchanges in 2016" and
18 million of those people would receive subsidies. "17 "For the people
who received subsidies, those subsidies would, on average, cover nearly
two-thirds of the premiums for their policies in 2016.""' The sheer
number of individuals covered in this estimate demonstrates that
Congress presumed that the drafters intended that the tax credits would
be available to all individuals. In addition to the CBO report, there are
several floor statements that demonstrate a congressional intent to apply
subsidies to both state and federal Exchanges. For example, one senator
stated, "tax credits will help to ensure all Americans can afford quality
health insurance,"'' 9 while another senator estimated that half of the
thirty million Americans with no health insurance "will qualify for...
tax credits to help them pay their premiums so they can have and afford
health insurance."' 20  The CBO report and congressional floor
statements support the Fourth Circuit's holding that Congress intended
for the credits to be available on a wide-scale basis.
Despite the lack of legislative history, it seems unlikely that Congress
would have intended the tax credits to be limited only to state-created
Exchanges, because this understanding of the statute means Congress
would have to entrust the functioning of major federal legislation to
political decisions of the states. While there are several historic
examples of the federal government giving states the power to
implement federal legislation-Social Security and Medicaid, for
example-these programs did not encounter the bitterness and
opposition in their implementation to the extent faced by the Affordable
Care Act.12' Most legislation that has a state implementation plan also
116. Congressional members requested the CBO to provide an analysis of how proposed health
care laws would affect premiums paid for health insurance in various markets. Although the CBO is
independent of Congress, this report was requested by congressional members and therefore is
persuasive insight into the intent of Congress in passing the ACA. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., An Analysis
of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 24 (Nov. 30,
2009), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/I -30-premiums.pdf.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 371 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 155 Cong. Rec. Sll, 964 (Nov.
21, 2009)).
120. Id. (quoting 155 Cong. Rec. S13, 559 (Dec. 20, 2009)).
121. See Official Social Security Website, The Evolution of Medicare,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/comingchapl.html, (noting there was "little opposition to the idea" of
20161
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has a federal implementation plan, so as to avoid "disastrous
consejuences."122  An example of such legislation is the Clean Air
Act. 12 In light of the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding the
ACA and many states' opposition towards its implementation, it is
unlikely that Congress would pass legislation that relied on state
implementation.
b. Language in the Affordable Care Act
Finally, if tax credits are not available to all individuals who purchase
insurance through an Exchange, there are parts of the Affordable Care
Act that are rendered absurd. For example, when looking at another
provision of the ACA, 124 there is a reporting requirement that can only
be met if tax credits are available to both state and federal Exchanges. 25
Section 36B(f) requires the IRS to reduce the amount of a taxpayer's
end-of-year premium tax credit by the amount of any advance payment
of such credit. 126 In order for the IRS to track advance payments, the
ACA requires that each Exchange provide certain information to the
Department of Treasury, including: level of coverage, premium costs,
the aggregate amount of any advance payment of credit or reductions,
the information of the primary insured, any information provided to the
Exchanges, and information necessary to determine whether a taxpayer
has received excess advance payments. 127  If subsidies were not
available on federally-run Exchanges, there would be no reason to
require federal Exchanges to report the amount an individual or family
receives in tax credits.128 This further highlights Congress's intent that
all purchasers on the Exchanges should receive tax credits because
Congress would not have imposed these reporting requirements if it had
Medicare and workers' compensation by the states) (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
122. Oral Argument at 19:24-20:4, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/oralargument-audio/23286.
123. See Clean Air Act § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. §7410(c)(l)(A)-(B) (1995) (noting that Section 110 of
the Clean Air Act gives the EPA authority to implement a federal plan to supersede a state plan if the
state implementation plan fails to satisfy certain criteria).
124. Such an analysis must be done because a court, when reviewing a statute, should not confine
itself to examining the particular provision at issue in isolation, but should consider the text as a whole
to determine the statute's meaning. See Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Construction and Application of
"Chevron Deference" to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 25 §
8 (2005) (citing FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
125. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 370 (4th Cir. 2014).
126. Id. See also 26 U.S.C.S. § 36B(0(1) (2010) ("The amount of the credit allowed under this
section for any taxable year shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of any advance
payment of such credit under section 1412 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.")
127. Id. (4th Cir. 2014). See also 26 U.S.C.S. § 36B(f)(3) (2010).
128. Id.
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thought that federal Exchanges would not offer subsidies.
2. The Court Must Give Deference to the IRS Rule Because Any Other
Reading Would Render the ACA Absurd
As previously mentioned, there are two main goals of the Affordable
Care Act: (1) to expand the number of individuals who have health
insurance coverage and (2) to reduce costs of health care. 129 This is
readily apparent in the language of the ACA itself, which says it will
"[achieve] near-universal coverage"' 130  and features the subtitle
"Immediate Improvements in Health Coverage for All Americans."'
131
Without the tax subsidies in place, such goals explicitly stated in the
ACA itself will not be feasible as shown in a recent study conducted by
the consulting firm, RAND Health.
132
The study found that eliminating the subsidies entirely would "cause
substantial increases in premiums, as well as large declines in
enrollment," both of which frustrate Congress's overarching goals in
passing the ACA.133 Without the ACA's subsidies in effect, the cost of
premiums will rise by 43.3% and enrollment will decrease by 68%,
leaving 11.3 million more Americans uninsured than if subsidies were in
place. Further, if the individual mandate requirement were
eliminated, premiums would rise by 7.1% and total enrollment in
Exchanges would decrease by 20.4%. 135  Removing the individual
mandate has a more modest effect on premium costs and the number of
individuals enrolled because the penalty associated with the mandate is
small relative to the size of the tax credits. 136 For example, "[i]n 2015,
the average penalty for enrollees eligible for tax credits would be $320,
compared with an average tax credit amount of $2,650 among enrollees
eligible for tax credits."' 137  This evidence demonstrates the vast
importance of tax credits, which arguably are even more imperative to
the success of the ACA than the individual mandate requirement.
The study notes that "[i]n scenarios in which the tax credits are
eliminated, [its] model predicts a near 'death spiral,' with very sharp
premium increases and drastic declines in individual market
129. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012).
130. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001, See. 1501(a)(D) (2010).
131. Id. at Subtitle A (2010) (emphasis added).
132. See generally Eibner & Saltzman, supra note 7.
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id.
135. Id. at21.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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enrollment."138 If enough individuals feel that the trade-off of accepting
the penalties under the ACA is more advantageous to signing up for
unsubsidized insurance, the death spiral occurs.139 A plan that does not
incentivize the young and healthy to enroll in coverage essentially
renders the ACA unworkable because affordable health insurance
requires risk-pooling, which spreads the costs of health care across a
wide range of individuals.140  For risk pooling to be effective, a large
number of healthy, low-cost individuals need to enroll in the
marketplace Exchanges to offset the costs of older and sicker
individuals.141 In short, without the tax credits in place, Americans are
far less likely to want to enroll in the marketplace Exchanges or be able
to afford health care coverage. 142
Because applying tax credits only to individuals enrolled in state-
established Exchanges would cause a rise in premiums and greatly
reduce the number of enrollees, the D.C. Circuit's reading of Section
36B renders parts of the ACA worthless. Therefore, as demonstrated by
the RAND Health study, without the tax credits in place, the policy
goals of the ACA simply will not be met. Because of this consequence,
the Fourth Circuit was correct in giving deference to the IRS Rule.
Though the Fourth Circuit reached its decision by analyzing the statute
under Chevron deference, it would have reached the same conclusion
under the less deferential Skidmore test, because the IRS reading of the
ACA is more persuasive than the D.C. Circuit's reading. The IRS Rule
meets all the requirements required by Skidmore: (1) "thoroughness,"
evidenced by its consideration of the broad policy goals of the Act; (2)
"validity of reasoning," demonstrated in nonpartisan materials like the
RAND Health study; and (3) "consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements," shown in the legislative history and actual language
of the Act itself. All of these factors are persuasive and require the court
to give the IRS Rule deference under Skidmore.
138. Id. at 2. A "death spiral" or "adverse selection" occurs when young, healthy customers drop
their insurance coverage-gambling they won't need it--because it is too expensive. Consequently, this
leaves a pool of subscribers who are older and sicker, resulting in more expensive insurance rates and
therefore more young and healthy people dropping insurance. This demonstrates that low-risk
individuals may need a tax credit to incentivize their signing up. This will result in improving the risk
pool and bringing down premiums. See also Matt Steinglass, The Insurance Death Spiral is Here, The
Economist Blog (Feb. 19, 2010, 4:17 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/02/health-insurance-premium-hikes.
139. Eibner & Saltzman, supra note 7, at 2, 4. This study notes that evidence from
Massachusetts--the only state that had a similar requirement before the ACA-suggests that an
individual mandate brings younger and healthier individuals in to the market.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. (finding that if the mandate was overturned, 8.2 million Americans would not purchase
health insurance).
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C. The Supreme Court Decision
Like in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the
majority opinion of the Court. 143 Notably, the majority held in favor of
the Federal Government without resorting to Chevron. As previously
discussed, Chevron requires the agency interpretation of the ambiguous
statute to prevail. This approach "is premised on the theory that a
statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to
the agency to fill the statutory gaps."' 144 However, the majority noted
that:
"In extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended
such an implicit delegation. This is one of those cases.
The tax credits are among the Act's key reforms,
involving billions of dollars in spending each year and
affecting the price of health insurance for millions of
people. Whether those credits are available on Federal
Exchanges is thus a question of deep 'economic and
political significance' that is central to this statutory
scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. It is
especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated
this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in
crafting health insurance policy of this sort." 1
45
Accordingly, because Congress did not delegate the interpretation of
Section 36B to the IRS, it is within the Court's jurisdiction to determine
the correct reading of Section 36B. 1
46
The majority then looked at Section 36B within the context of the
ACA as a whole. 14 7 It found that the seemingly unambiguous language
of Section 36B-"established by the State"-is not so clear-cut when
reviewed within the context of the entire Act. 148  For example, if
Exchanges could only be established by the state, there would be no
"qualified individuals" on federal Exchanges. 149 Yet, the ACA clearly
anticipated that there would be qualified individuals on every
Exchange.150 Throughout the ACA, it is stated that Exchanges make
available qualified health plans to qualified individuals, which is
143. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
144. Id. at 2488.
145. Id. at 2489 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490.
149. Id.
150. Id.
2016]
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something the Exchanges could not do if there was no such Exchange
for individuals who live in a state where no Exchange was
established. 15 1 If Congress intended Section 36B to only apply to state
Exchanges, it would have provided detailed instructions concerning
customers on federal Exchanges just as it did concerning customers on
state Exchanges. 152  Since Congress did not make any distinctions
between these two Exchanges, it must be assumed that Section 36B is
ambiguous and the intent of Congress was that the tax credits apply to
all Exchanges. 1
53
Given that the text is ambiguous, the Court looked at the broader
structure of the ACA to determine the true meaning of Section 36B. 154
The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Section 36B
because it would destabilize the individual insurance market and create a
death spiral that Congress intended to avoid. 155 Without the tax credits
made available to purchasers on the federal Exchanges, dramatically
fewer individuals would be able to purchase health insurance. 156 For
example, approximately 87% of individuals who purchased health
insurance on Federal Exchanges did so with tax credits. 157 Virtually all
of these individuals would be unable to purchase insurance without the
tax credits in place, making the ACA obsolete and also failing to
achieve its ultimate goal: near universal health care coverage for all
Americans. 58 In light of these consequences, it is inconceivable that
Congress intended for the ACA to operate without tax subsidies
available on all Exchanges. 159
The majority concludes that the ACA had inconsistencies concerning
the Exchanges because the Act was written "behind closed doors rather
than though the traditional legislative process."' 60  The dissent even
admits that laws often include mismatched provisions and because the
ACA spans 900 pages, "it would be amazing if its provisions all lined up
perfectly with each other."' 6 ' Furthermore, the dissent notes that it is
natural for slight mismatches to occur in legislation when "lawmakers
151. Id. (citing § 18031(d)(2)(A) requiring all Exchanges to "make available qualified health
plans to qualified individuals")and § 18031(e)(l)(B) (providing that an Exchange must consider "the
interests of qualified individuals.., in the State or States in which such Exchange operates")).
152. Id. atn. 1.
153. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490.
154. Id. at 2492.
155. Id. at 2493.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
159. Id. at 2494.
160. Id. at 2492.
161. Id. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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draft a single statutory provision to cover different kinds of
situations."' 162 As a result, the majority maintains that the ACA "does
not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of
such significant legislation."' 163 However, despite this inartful drafting,
§ 18041 refutes the argument that Congress believed it was offering the
states a deal they could not refuse.' 64 Section 18041 provides that if a
state elects not to establish an Exchange, the Secretary "shall . . .
establish and operate such Exchange within the State." 165 The Court's
decision therefore is not a rewriting of the law, but merely a clarification
of poorly and hastily written legislation.
While the majority opinion makes a compelling argument for why
Section 36B must be considered ambiguous, it does not base its decision
on Chevron or Skidmore. Instead of deferring to the agency
interpretation, the majority found that the courts, not agencies, have the
primary role of interpreting statutes that have "economic and political
significance." 1 66  Therefore, the Court did not rely on Chevron or
Skidmore, but based its decision on a subsidiary doctrine in
administrative law known as the "major questions doctrine."' 167 This
doctrine holds that "Congress would not intend to give agencies
authority over 'major questions' without specific authorization."' 168 This
reflects a lack of unanimity of what Chevron deference means and calls
into question when agency deference should be given.
Chief Justice Roberts' reasoning for moving away from the
established precedent of Chevron is unconvincing. While the majority
purports that the IRS has no expertise in crafting and interpreting health
insurance policies, the IRS regularly makes health-related rules and
clearly has expertise in provisions that affect or work in conjunction
with the tax code. 169 Furthermore, there are multiple areas within the
tax code where IRS expertise is lacking, but the IRS interpretation is
given deference. For example, § 45 of the tax code includes credits for
creating electricity from biomass. 170 The IRS interprets these biomass
162. Id. at 2501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
164. Id. at 2494.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2483.
167. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128
HARV. L. REv. 1897, 1955 (2015) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)).
168. Id.
169. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
170. Andy Grewel, The IRS Isn't an Expert, YALE J. ON REG. (June 29, 2015),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-irs-isn-t-an-expert-by-andy-grewal.
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provisions despite not being an expert on renewable energy. 171 While
the IRS is not an expert in health care or energy, the agency is an expert
in deciphering complex tax code provisions. The Court easily could
have made the same decision by applying the Chevron or Skidmore
framework. This move away from Chevron and Skidmore effectively
places the power to interpret ambiguous statutes with the Judiciary
instead of the Executive Branch. Therefore, while the Court came to the
correct conclusion upholding the tax credits under the ACA, its
complete disregard of Chevron and Skidmore was unprecedented and
will cause more uncertainty for administrative agencies and the
government going forward.
V. CONCLUSION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted to
increase the number of individuals covered by health insurance and to
lower the cost of health care premiums.' 72 Essential to achieving this
goal is the availability of tax credits on marketplace Exchanges.
Without subsidies available at both the state and federal levels, not as
many individuals will purchase coverage, resulting in a death spiral of
increased health care costs and fewer persons in the insurance pool. 173
The Supreme Court found that the ACA was written ambiguously and
tax credits should be available to individuals on both the state and
federal Exchanges.' 74 The Supreme Court based this decision on the
major questions doctrine, ruling that the courts and not agencies are
better suited to settle matters of "economic and political
significance."' 175 This ruling dismissed the Chevron and Skidmore tests
as controlling in this situation, which will cause greater confusion and
uncertainty going forward for administrative agencies and the
government. Instead, the Court should have applied the Skidmore test
and given deference to the IRS Rule because its construction of the
statute was in accord with congressional intent, and the IRS had the
expertise to interpret Section 36B since this provision dealt exclusively
with the tax code.
171. Id.
172. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
173. Eibner & Saltzman, supra note 7.
174. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2481, at syllabus.
175. Id. at 2489.
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